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Chapter 2 
 
Educational mechanisms of dioramas  
Michael May1 & Marianne Achiam1  
1Department of Science Education, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
The diorama remains one of the most popular exhibit types in museums, and it has 
proven its educational potential time and time again. In spite of this, the specific 
mechanisms behind that educational potential remain unclear. In other words, museum 
practitioners and museum researchers know that dioramas work, we just don’t know 
how they work. In the following, we use visual perception theory as well as cognitive 
linguistics to explain the perceptual and meaning-making mechanisms that give 
dioramas their unique potential. Specifically, we construct a framework to understand 
how museum visitors can ‘translate’ the visual scene from what is essentially a 
collection of specimens in a box into a meaningful experience.  
Meeting the objects 
Designers and curators tend to take their own perspective on the museum experience 
and conceptualize museum visits as communication: an indirect communication of 
design intentions to visitors mediated by exhibits, labels, explanatory signs, and 
narratives. From the perspective of the museum visitor, however, the basic level 
experience can best be described as a meeting with artefacts or natural objects on 
display. Museum artefacts and objects may involve interaction and dialogue, but usually 
they are not directly communicative unless they take the form of guided tours, 
multimedia installations or live animals. Rather than a form of communication we will 
frame the basic level experience of museum visitors as a form of inquiry.  
Meeting artefacts and object in the museum context is bound to raise implicit questions 
of identification corresponding to explicit questions such as “what is this?” The interest 
and motivation of museum visitors will also orient their attention, but embodied 
perception and basic level categories are generally at the core of human experience 
(Evans & Green 2006). At a basic level of observation visitors may have enough prior 
knowledge about an exhibition and its subject matter to identify objects immediately. 
The inquiry aspect of a museum visit will arise when visitors are confronted with 
exhibited objects they cannot immediately identify or situations they do not understand. 
This can set in motion a sequence of actions such as looking for information on labels or 
explanatory signs next to a diorama. Our focus here is however on the experience of and 
learning from dioramas in natural history museums (although we note that dioramas 
also occur in anthropological and technical museums, and that similar educational 
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mechanisms may be at play in these settings). As a naturalistic or pseudo-naturalistic 
display of objects (e.g. humans, animals, plants, machines) in their natural or cultural 
environment, dioramas and their interpretation can appear straightforward, but 
complexity hides behind the naturalistic surface. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Oryx gazelle diorama from the American Museums of Natural History. Image courtesy of 
Creative Commons,  https://www.flickr.com/photos/mukluk/440494699 
Consider the African Oryx gazelle (Gemsbok in Afrikaans) diorama in Figure 2.1 from 
the American Museum of Natural History in New York. Visitors might find this static 
display of gazelles rather uneventful. We immediately recognize five similar gazelles 
assembled on an African savannah, and we will probably focus at first on their 
impressive horns. If we dwell in front of the diorama, we might, however, be more 
intrigued or even disturbed by the scene. The gazelles are not just on display as in a 
static image: we discover that they are actually looking back at us! We know that we are 
just looking at artefacts, but for a moment we are propelled into the scene on the 
savannah, as if we were really there as participants in an interspecies meeting. We have 
created an imagined event from the static display of artefacts, but how is this possible? 
Before discussing this we will introduce some concepts from perceptual psychology and 
cognitive linguistics in order to analyse how we recognize and interpret visual scenes. 
The Gestalt laws of perception 
Even though the concept of Gestalt is commonly used to describe perceptual patterns, 
the origin and nature of the Gestalt laws are not generally appreciated. Gestalt 
psychology gradually developed as a reaction to the focus of early experimental 
psychology on elementary sensations in the beginning of the 20th century. Perceptual 
psychology had been pioneered by physicists, among others Herman von Helmholtz 
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(1821–1894) and Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), but in the specific form of a 
psychophysics of sensations. Inspired by phenomenology, Carl Stumpf (1848–1936) 
founded an institute for experimental psychology in Berlin around 1900, and the 
movement known as Gestalt psychology was formed by his students Max Wertheimer 
(1880–1943), Kurt Koffka (1886–1941), Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) and Kurt 
Lewin (1890–1947). In reaction to the elementary sensations studied by classical 
experimental psychology the Gestalt psychologists claimed that the perceptual 
experience of humans and others animals was given in the form of structured wholes, 
and that these ‘Gestalten’ had their own inner laws of organization and dynamics (Ash 
1998, 220). The first Gestalt laws were formulated by Max Wertheimer in the early 
1920s, and included the basic principles of proximity, similarity, closure and good 
continuation, and Köhler made German Gestalt theory known internationally through its 
opposition to introspection as well as to behaviourism (Köhler 1947). 
The basic Gestalt principles are still valid today, and widely utilised in information 
visualization and interface design (Palmer 1992; Ware 2000). According to the 
proximity principle we will experience objects that are spatially close as meaningfully 
grouped together, and according to the similarity principle we will experience objects 
that are visually similar in shape, size or colour as meaningfully grouped together. 
Closure and good continuation are related phenomena where we tend to supplement 
perceived curves and shapes in order to identify them as simple geometric figures. We 
will for instance recognize a broken ring as a circle and a broken line as a line, and we 
will similarly tend to look for simple geometric shapes in the contours of objects, even 
if we have to supplement with our own imaginary contours. These principles of closure 
and continuation are important for naturalistic perception. Notice how we will naturally 
perceive the partially occluded gazelle in the background of the diorama (Figure 2.1) as 
a whole gazelle, and not as a gazelle head severed from the rear part of the animal! 
Furthermore we clearly recognize the gazelles as a group closely related by spatial 
proximity, and – as stressed by the Gestalt psychologists – we experience all these 
phenomena as given in perception and not as assembled or constructed from elementary 
sensations.  
This leads us to another aspect of the perceived scene, namely its organization into 
foregrounded figures and the background of the visual scene. Ambiguities of the figure-
ground organization were discovered by the Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin (1886–
1951) and further discussed by Köhler, but the fundamental figure-ground phenomena is 
the separation itself, i.e. the foregrounding of figures in perception. In order to work out 
how the Gestalt principles of perception work as part of a more comprehensive 
interpretation of visual scenes, we have to consider how they interact with embodied 
cognition and language. This is explicitly addressed in cognitive linguistics where the 
grammatical structures of natural languages can be seen to add more structure to the 
organizing principles of perception (Evans & Green 2006).    
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Schematic meaning in grammar and cognition 
One of the fundamental assumptions in cognitive linguistics is the idea that grammar is 
not a formal syntactic system but carries meaning beyond the individual words in 
phrases. This is stressed in different traditions of cognitive linguistics such as cognitive 
semantics (Talmy 2000) and cognitive grammar (Langacker 2013). The grammatical 
meaning in conveyed by word classes (nouns, verbs, prepositions, adjectives etc.) and 
by grammatical forms such as metaphorical constructions and other types of schematic 
and idiomatic expressions. Nouns represent objects, verbs events, prepositions relations, 
and adjectives properties, and as such they carry schematic meanings beyond the 
individual words. 
Another fundamental assumption in cognitive linguistics is the idea that spatial 
representation and spatial reasoning plays an important role in binding together 
language, cognition, and action by sharing schematic meaning. An example is the 
figure-ground effect in perception that is elaborated in natural language by linguistic 
operations that will correspondingly profile objects and events in the foreground of a 
described scene and push other aspects of a situation in the background. Another 
example is that we will always construe a described situation from a particular 
perspective, just as we will always experience a scene perceptually from a particular 
physical perspective. 
It is because perception and language share schematic meanings that it is possible to 
‘translate’ between them. Otherwise it would be a mystery how the visual structure of a 
situation could somehow be related to structures in a language. We do, however, find it 
quite easy to describe the scene of a situation we are experiencing or conversely, to 
visualize in our imagination the scene of a situation being described to us.  
Consider the tiger diorama in Figure 2.2 from the Natural History Museum in Helsinki. 
Visitors can move past the diorama and change their physical perspective from e.g. 
behind the tiger to a perspective in front of the deer being attacked. This will correspond 
to a change in relevant descriptions from the perspective of the tiger as grammatical 
subject (e.g. “The tiger attacks the dear”) to a passive construction where the deer is the 
grammatical subject (e.g. “The deer is attacked by the tiger”). The most striking feature 
of the diorama is clearly that the static scene is experienced as a dramatic event. The 
Gestalt psychologist was in fact preoccupied by the dynamic nature of apparently static 
visual scenes as well as the apparent motion constructed as a Gestalt from a sequence of 
static images (Ash 1998). The tiger diorama seems to take us a step further though: even 
though we only see a single ‘frozen’ image of the apparent movement, we are 
compelled to imagine the whole event of the tiger’s leaping jump and the attempted 
escape of the deer. We do not need a series of ‘snapshot’ scenes in order to complete the 
movement (cf. the Gestalt effect of good continuation). We can actually ‘see’ the 
movement event in the static scene.  
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 Figure 2.2. Tiger diorama at the Natural History Museum in Helsinki, Finland. Image courtesy of 
Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. 
On the level of language this event can be elaborated in different ways according to the 
perspective we take in construing the situation, i.e. with the tiger or the deer as 
grammatical subjects and actors in the imagined event (“The tiger attacks the deer”, 
“The deer is attacked by the tiger”). We can however also profile the situation in 
different ways when describing it, corresponding to the attention we can pay to different 
aspects of the situation. We can for instance say that “the dear is fleeing” profiling only 
the deer, or “the tiger is jumping” profiling only the tiger. We can even profile the 
background and imagine a past event (“It has been snowing”). This distribution of 
attention is another fundamental aspect of how meaning is constructed in language and 
perception (Talmy 2000). 
The different possibilities of meaning construction that arise from Gestalt perception of 
visual scenes and their basic schematization, as well as the different choices of 
perspective and profiling, will simultaneously provide possibilities for dialogue and 
learning. The imagined event of the tiger diorama can trigger many questions 
concerning aspects of the situation: How can the tiger manage to jump that high? Will 
the deer have any chance of escaping? Many types of inquiry about the scene can depart 
from the diorama: about the event itself, about the species involved, about the landscape 
and its location, and even about more conceptual and theoretical issues derived from the 
scene such as predator-prey relations, the habitats of tigers, and their status as an 
endangered species. 
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Levels of meaning 
The construction of meaning made possible by the diorama is however not limited to the 
lexical level of object recognition and the phrastic level of scenic descriptions that we 
have discussed so far. Families and groups of children observing the tiger diorama will 
most likely engage in storytelling and dialogue. This is meaning construction at a 
narrative level of meaning (cf. Achiam et al., 2014). In this way the apparent motion of 
the scene will not only be the basis of an imagined event, but also the point of departure 
for a narration of its probable past and its possible future as well as the imagined 
intentions of the involved figures. 
The kind of involvement we experience with the scenes and imagined events of 
dioramas bears witness to our power of imagination and the organizing power of 
language and perception. Meaning construction can be understood as proceeding on a 
number of levels from the perceived objects and their basic description (lexical level), to 
the construal of situations and events (phrastic level), and to their elaboration into 
stories about the past and the future as well as the intentions of displayed actors. On an 
even higher level of construction we have to acknowledge that the diorama as a whole, 
as well as the actors within it, might take on a communicative role. The diorama can 
have a rhetorical or “ideological” function by addressing the visitor as a spectator and as 
a witness to a particular scene. Looking at the scene of the tiger diorama we are in sense 
caught as passive bystanders to the (imagined) dramatic event, and the diorama is 
thereby addressing us and imposing additional meaning associated with survival or 
ideological conceptions (e.g. “nature is cruel”). This we will call the discursive level of 
meaning. In semiotics this form of implicit communication that addresses us as 
participants is often called enunciation. 
The discursive level is also operative in the Oryx gazelle diorama of Figure 2.1, and this 
is what can appear as disturbing. In the moment when we realize that the group of 
gazelles are looking back at us, we are (so to speak) addressed by them and their gaze. 
This is a moment of suspension of disbelief, where we meet the other species (in our 
imagination). Here, the diorama is a powerful mechanism for including the visitor in the 
scene, and thus much more than a mere image or a collection of artefacts. 
Learning from dioramas 
The learning potential of the diorama arises from the imaginative richness of the content 
it creates by placing artefacts and natural objects within a naturalistic scene (or relevant 
cultural context in the case of technical museums). There are, however, also several 
problems of learning associated with the diorama. One potential problem is the very 
naturalistic articulation of the diorama that creates an apparent realism that could entail 
false inferences. One typical example from museums of natural history is the 
educational attempt to present many species that live together in a particular habitat. In 
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order to present several species within the frame of the diorama they are often clustered 
very closely in the scene, and sometimes a (false) reason for this is introduced in the 
scene itself, for example by distributing the animals around a water hole. In reality 
different species would disperse over a larger area. An example is seen in the African 
Plains diorama from the American Museum of Natural history (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3. Close clustering of species in the Plains diorama of the American Museum of Natural 
History. Image courtesy of Creative Commons: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Plains_Diorama.JPG 
Some dioramas do however break off from this apparent realism by being visually more 
schematic. An example is the Bird cliff diorama displaying typical birds of the Faroe 
Islands from the Museum of Natural History in Copenhagen (Figure 2.4). This diorama 
has a black and white image of the tall cliffs characteristic of the Faroe Islands in the 
background, but the exhibited birds in the foreground are placed on highly schematic 
(and purple!) platforms as a kind of visual metaphor for cliffs. Significantly, these 
metaphorical cliffs do not look like the image of cliffs in the background.  
The absence of apparent realism in the Bird cliff diorama is also conveyed by the 
location of text within the diorama labelling and describing the different species. This 
disruption of apparent realism could be helpful in avoiding the potential mistakes in 
reasoning about the living space of different species within a habitat, but on the other 
hand the fascination of the naturalistic diorama is lost in this schematic display. 
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 Figure 2.4. Highly schematic Bird cliff diorama from the Museum of Natural History, Copenhagen. 
Image courtesy of Michael May. 
The learning potential of dioramas should also be understood in the larger context of the 
explanatory signs outside the frame of the diorama, the possible interactive mechanisms 
supported (like user-controlled selective spotlights), the potential of supplementary 
multimedia like explanatory speech, smartphone apps, ambient sound or additional 
video next to the diorama. Furthermore, the meaning construction of visitors will often 
take place within dialogues with others (families, school classes) rather than privately 
(in thought), and accordingly the meaning construction and inquiry will be externalised 
and embedded in dialogues as fragments of speech (cf. the analysis examples in Achiam 
et al. 2014).  
Conclusion 
Naturalistic habitat dioramas have been described as “windows on nature” (Quinn, cit. 
Kamcke & Hutterer 2015). These types of naturalistic dioramas displaying animal and 
plant specimens in their natural habitat were developed in association with a gradual 
epistemological change in the natural sciences towards an awareness of systems and 
systemic relations in nature, and habitat dioramas were intended to convey an 
appreciation of the relationships between the flora and fauna of an environment (Rader 
& Cain 2014; Marandino et al. 2015). It is striking that this gradual shift in the public 
communication of natural history in the museum context towards scientific naturalism 
and an awareness of ecological systems occurred in parallel with the rise of Gestalt 
psychology and the critique of classical experimental psychology and its focus on 
psychophysics of sensations and isolated stimulus-response mechanisms.  
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Habitat dioramas are accordingly much more than windows on nature in the basic sense 
of aesthetic and naturalistic displays. They provoke inquiry and reflection through the 
meaning construction they support. The traditional perspective on dioramas as 
communicating ‘messages’ is, however, too simplistic, as we have indicated here. It can 
be argued, for example, that the habitat diorama often conveys an indirect message 
corresponding to the intention to increase awareness about nature conservation (Kamcke 
& Hutterer 2015), but the reference to indirect or unspoken communication does not 
explain the educational mechanism of the diorama, i.e. how this interpretation of the 
diorama can actually take place. Our proposal has been that we can understand the 
educational mechanism of the diorama by referring to the principles of visual object and 
scene recognition as originally described by the Gestalts psychologists, and furthermore 
by embedding this understanding in a more comprehensive conceptualization of 
meaning construction as developed within cognitive linguistics (Evans & Green 2006) – 
specifically in cognitive semantics (Talmy 2000) and cognitive grammar (Langacker 
2013).  
Meaning construction from observing dioramas will take place on several levels of 
meaning starting with the perceptual object and scene recognition and the corresponding 
lexical identification of objects. Museum visitors will then be able to conceptualize the 
scene of a diorama on a phrastic level corresponding to simple statements in natural 
language about the scene in accordance with their prior knowledge about the exhibited 
objects. This sentence-like meaning can take the form of inner thoughts or fragments of 
speech as part of a dialogue between visitors sharing an experience. A further level of 
meaning is the narrative level, where stories are constructed from the scene of the 
diorama. These stories are sometimes supported by added external sources such as 
video and explanatory diagrams, but stories can be invented by visitors even without 
such external support (Achiam et al. 2014). Finally a discursive level of enunciation is 
required to understand how the diorama can actually address us without any direct 
speech, and this is where the rhetorical and ideological messages of the habitat diorama 
should be positioned. A detailed understanding of these levels of meaning and how they 
are connected would of course require a more comprehensive analysis than we have 
attempted here.  
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